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CONCLUSION

Technical legal distinctions should not govern application of the doctrine
of disregard of the corporate fiction. The purpose for which the corporation
was organized and used should be emphasized rather than factors tending to
show abnormal control or unity of interest and ownership.
Florida courts consider the use of the corporation in a fraudulent or misleading manner sufficient cause for application of the doctrine. Additionally,
there is a trend toward using constructive fraud as a reason sufficient to
warrant disregard of the corporate fiction. This trend is laudable, for it
offers courts flexibility in using the doctrine to fashion equitable remedies.
It must be emphasized, however, that the mere existence of unpaid creditors
does not compel a finding of constructive fraud. The reason for this is that
the policy underlying the grant of limited liability contemplates shifting
part of the risk of loss to the creditor to encourage risk capital investment by
corporate shareholders. This policy also envisions a certain minimum level

of capital investment. If the corporation is inadequately capitalized the investment quid pro quo is absent, and the undercapitalization should be
considered a wrong sufficient to justify application of the doctrine of disregarding the corporate fiction.
J. PErN CAROLAN, III

COMPULSORY UNITIZATION IN FLORIDA:
A NEW EMPHASIS IN THE ENERGY CRISIS?
America's increased demand for energy supplies requires a program to
maximize production and prevent waste of our oil and gas reserves.' At
present, the United States consumes almost one-third of the world's energy
supplies, even though it accounts for only six per cent of the world's population.2 Oil accounts for forty-five per cent of today's energy consumption, yet
experts estimate that reserves of the United States include only enough recoverable deposits to supply about another two decades.3 This diminishing
supply in the face of expanding demand is the essence of the energy crisis
confronting Americans and the majority of the world.
1. Oil and gas reserves are an extractive, nonrenewable natural resource, unlike other
resources such as solar energy, hydrogen, and hydro-electric power that are renewable
or essentially infinite in quantity.
2. The Energy Crisis: Time for Action, TIME, May 7, 1973, at 41.
3. Id.
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While an oil field4 is divided into many segments by surface property
lines, maximum recovery of the oil deposits can be achieved only by combining developmental and operational phases of production. Combining the
various segments of a field into a single efficient unit is the purpose of unitization. 5 Our rapidly depleting oil and gas resources should encourage compulsory unitization efforts6 to ensure maximum recovery and production.
Thus, while unitization is not a new concept,7 it must be particularly emphasized in the energy crisis if supply is to match demand.
Florida is expected to contribute substantially to America's energy needs.
The latest oil discovery in northwest Florida is the most significant find of
this decade in the continental United States, with an estimated total production of 337 million barrels. 8 Major oil exploration and discovery is expected
to continue throughout the state,9 and to provide Florida with a valuable
addition to the established citrus and tourist industries.
This note explores the geological and mechanical aspects of petroleum
production, early conservation and property laws, and the need for compulsory
consolidation provisions in state statutes. Florida's former statutory unitization provisions and the recently enacted statutory amendment are analyzed
and the legal ramifications of a unitized operation discussed.

4. A field is the general area underlaid or appearing to be underlaid by at least one
pool. A pool is an underground reservoir containing a common accumulation of oil or
gas (or both) as distinguished from a field that may relate to two or more pools. The
words "field" and "pool" have the same meaning when only one underground reservoir is
involved. FLA. STAT. §§377.19(6), (7) (1973).
5. See Eckman, Statutory Fieldwide Oil and Gas Units: A Review for Future Agreements, 6 NATURAL Rasouacas LAw. 339, 343-44 (1973).
6. See generally id. at 353.
7. The first serious consideration of emphasizing conservation and efficiency in the
production of oil and gas occurred in 1924 when Henry L. Doherty, President of H. L.
Doherty & Co., proposed a federal compulsory unitization law. This proposal met with
fierce opposition from the oil and gas industry. The individual oilman objected to government interference and the idea of relinquishing operation of his property to a unit operator as required by the unitization agreement. Although acceptance of Doherty's proposal
was slow to develop, unitization later became recognized as the most logical method both
to assure efficiency in the development and operation of oil fields and to achieve equity
among landowners. World War 11 was a great impetus to unitization efforts because of the
shortage of material and the absolute need for conservation. Similar conditions have led
to renewed interest in unitization today. See 1 R. MYas, THE LAw OF POOLINo AND UNMZATION: VOLUNTARY -

COMPULSORY

§1.02, at 20 (2d ed. 1967); Doggett, PracticalLegal Problems

Encountered in the Formation, Operation and Dissolution of Fieldwide Oil and Gas Units,
16 OKLA. L. Rxv. 1, 2-3 (1963).
8. Interview with Charles W. Hendry, Jr., Bureau Chief and Oil and Gas Administrator,
Bureau of Geology, Fla. Dep't of Natural Resources, in Tallahassee, Fla., April 5, 1974
[hereinafter cited as Hendry Interview]. Discovery of the oil reserve, known as the Jay
Field, occurred in 1970 in Santa Rosa and Escambia Counties. This discovery is the most
significant find in the lower forty-eight states in the last ten years. Of course, it does not
compare to the giant East Texas oil fields, which have produced billions of barrels of oil
over the many years since their discovery. It is also substantially smaller than the fields
that will supply the Alaskan pipeline.
9. Id.
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OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION

Geological Aspects of Petroleum Production
A background knowledge of the geological and mechanical aspects of oil
and gas production is required to understand the problems of compulsory
unitization. 10 Oil and gas can be found naturally in sedimentary rocks,"
which possess in varying degrees the physical qualities of porosity and permeability necessary for the accumulation of oil and gas in commercial quantities and the production thereof.' 2 In searching for oil the geologist looks for
underground formations known as reservoir traps,'

3

composed of tilted strata

of sedimentary rock overlain by impervious materials that confine oil and
gas.' 4 These reservoir traps can be proved only by exploratory drilling or "wildcatting."' 5 The location of the "wildcat" well is selected by the petroleum
geologist, who studies the surface of the ground and the character of the
outcropping rock strata, 6 as well as the substrata characteristics through the
use of seismographic tests.' 7 Of all wells drilled (including those drilled in
new fields to define the limits), only one in ten strikes oil, and of every 100
exploratory wells drilled in search of new fields, less than two find enough
petroleum to be commercially successful.' 8

10.

See INTERSTATE OIL COMPACr COMM'NI ENGINEERING COMM.,

OIL AND

GAS PRODUCTION

(1951) [hereinafter cited as OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION]. See also 1 IV. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS
§4, at 9-17 (2d ed. 1954); 1 H. WILLIAMS S C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§102-04 (1973).
11. There are principally three types of sedimentary rock that accumulate oil and gas:
sandstones, limestones, and some shales. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, §102,
at 2.
12. Porosity allows sedimentary rock to hold oil much like a sponge holds water.
Permeability allows the oil to move through the rock, an action necessary for recovery by
the drilling process. Id. See W. SUMMERS, supra note 10, §4, at 9 n.8.
13. 2 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE §27.8, at 487 (1965).
14. 1 H. WILLIAMS 8, C. Myi:Rs, supra note 10, §102, at 3. The reservoir traps of the Jay
Field were caused by faulting, the cracking and breaking of a rock plane. This causes an "up
dip" of the sedimentary rock, which pinches out against other strata impervious to oil and
gas, thus trapping oil and gas in the reservoir. See generally 2 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY
PRACTICE §27.8, at 487 (1965).
15. A wildcat well is an "exploratory well .. . drilled in unproven territory, that is, in
a horizon from which there is no production in the general area." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 509 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAS TERMS]. Because of the enormous expense involved in exploratory drilling it is usually
undertaken by major oil companies. The companies' petroleum geologists recommend to the
exploration departments land to lease, after careful study of the surface and subsurface characteristics. Oil and gas leases are then secured from the landowners, a specific site is selected,
and a test well is sunk.
16. 2 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE §27.8, at 487 (2d ser. 1965).
17. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, §103, at 6. As used in the oil industry
the seismograph records the shock waves set off by a series of explosions. By measuring the
time intervals between the explosion and return of the shock waves from a reflecting substrata the geophysicist can determine the underground structure and presence oE structural
traps in the subsurface. See MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 15, at 411.
18. Hendry Interview, supra note 8.
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Mechanical Aspects of Petroleum Production
A reservoir trap usually contains oil, gas, and water held under higher
hydrostatic pressure than is normal for comparable depths.' 9 These liquids
are arranged in order of their densities, or specific gravities, 20 with the gas
collecting near the top of the trap, the oil in the middle, and the water at
the bottom. 21 In most reservoirs, when the trap is opened by the sinking of
22
a well, the pressure differential existing between the trap and the surface
drives the oil up the well bore toward the surface. 23 This is the first stage of
operations, in which the reservoir trap is producing under its own energy, and
is called "primary recovery."' 4 Primary recovery typically yields only ten to
thirty per cent of the original hydrocarbons in place.25 When primary production declines or ceases, artificial repressuring is required to replace reservoir
energy and enhance oil recovery. This is accomplished during the second stage
of operations by forcing gas or water through injection wells 2 into the
reservoir, displacing the oil and forcing it toward the production wells. 2 7 The
28
process is referred to as "secondary recovery."'
10, at 21.
20. Specific gravity is the ratio between the weight of equal volumes of water and another substance measured at standard temperature and pressure with the weight of water
being assigned a value of 1. The specific gravity of oil is normally expressed in the industry
in degrees of A.P.I. gravity. MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 15, at 430. A.P.I.
refers to the American Petroleum Institute scale. Oil with the least specific gravity has the
highest A.P.l. gravity. Usually, the higher the A.P.I. gravity the greater the value of the oil.
Id. at 19.
21. W. SUMMERS, supra note 10, §4, at 9.
22. In a gas expansion reservoir, boring the well hole into the reservoir rock causes a
reduction of pressure and allows the gas to expand, forcing the oil to the opening and
pushing it to the surface. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, §104, at 12. In a
water expansion reservoir the same action occurs. Water is only slightly compressible but in
a deep reservoir this compressibility is magnified, producing great pressure. When the well
opening reduces pressure, the water in the bottom of the reservoir trap expands pushing the
oil ahead of it. See OIL AND GAS PRODUGTION, supra note 10, at 24.
23. See generally H. WILLIAMS & C. IEYERs, supra note 10, §104, at 12.
24. "Primary recovery" is the oil, gas, or oil and gas recovered by any method (natural
flow or artificial lift) that may be employed to produce through a single well hole; the
fluid enters the well hole by action of native reservoir energy or gravity. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OIL IN TE UNITED STATES 255 (1942).
25. Eckman, supra note 5, at 342. See text accompanying note 85 infra (discussing the
comparable figures for the Jay Field).
26. An injection well is employed during secondary recovery "for the introduction into
an underground stratum of water or gas under pressure." MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS,
supra note 15, at 225.
27. A production well is "a well that produces oil or gas." It may be used in either of
two ways: (1) as "a well that produces in paying quantities (that is, a well for which proceeds
from production exceed operating expenses)" or (2) as "a well that produces in any quantity
whatsoever." Id. at 347.
28. Secondary recovery is the oil, gas, or oil and gas recovered by any method (artificial
flowing or pumping) involving the joint use of two or more well holes. Secondary recovery
is generally considered to be the recovery obtained by injection of liquids or gases into the
reservoir for the purpose of augmenting reservoir energy; usually, but not necessarily, this
19. OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION, supra note
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Although secondary recovery operations greatly increase recovery percentages, another factor is extremely important to maximum recovery. The
rate of production 29 from each producing well must be closely regulated during
both the primary and the secondary stages to achieve maximum recovery from
the reservoir. If production is too fast, pressure in the reservoir is reduced
too rapidly for oil in the portions of the reservoir with lower permeability to
escape as quickly as the sunounding oil. The rapidly moving gas or water
will then bypass and leave this oil almost irretrievably lost."0
The relation of reservoir structure and the mechanics of petroleum production to maximum recovery illustrates the importance of controlling recovery operations. The petroleum reservoir is a natural unit and any production affects the pressure throughout the reservoir. 31 In turn, pressure and the
rate of production dictate the recovery from the field. Therefore, maximum
fieldwide recovery can be assured only by closely regulating the initial drilling
of wells, the primary and secondary stages of recovery, and the allowable
rates of production. 2 Unitization incorporates these factors and, as the following sections illustrate, is the best method available to achieve efficient production.
CONSERVATION AND THE NEED FOR COMPULSORY PROVISIONS IN STATE STATUTES

The history of petroleum production is replete with tremendous waste,
partially caused by the unfamiliarity of courts with the subject matter under
consideration. Analogies were drawn to the law applicable to ownership of
wild animals and similar objects to determine the ownership of oil and gas. 33
This comparison led to establishment of the rule of capture and its outgrowth, the offset drilling rule. 3 4 Both had a serious adverse effect on conservation efforts.3 5 State consolidation statutes based on the police power were
enacted to overcome this harmful effect.
is done after the primary recovery phase has passed. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OIL IN THE UNITED STATES

244 (1942).

29. The rate of production is governed by the well "allowable." The allowable is "the
amount of oil (or gas) which a well . . . is permitted to produce under proration orders of
a state regulatory commission." MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 15, at 14. See
note 131 infra.
30. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, §104, at 13-14; Eckman, supra note 5,
at 342.
31. CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY 14 (B. Murphy ed. 1948).
32. See Eckman, supra note 5, at 342-43.
33. Bernard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 A. 801 (1907). The court
held that oil was "ferae naturae" (of wild nature), from which idea the "nonownership"
theory developed. Under this theory, ownership was dependent upon "capture," that is,
physical possession of the oil or gas.
84. See Moses, Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Unit Operations of Oil Fields, 21
TEXAS L. REv. 748 (1943).
85. The rule of capture, the offset drilling rule, and their effect on conservation are
discussed in R. MYERS, supra note 7, §§1.03, 13.01-.02; H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note
10, §§208-204.9; Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and
Gas, 18 TEXAS L. REV. 391 (1935); Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization,
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Rule of Capture and Early Conservation Efforts

The rule of capture led to the period characterized as a " 'git there fustest
with the mostest' wells" type development.- Under this riule 7 "[t]he owner of
a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from the
wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas
migrated from adjoining lands."38s The corollary to the rule of capture, the
offset drilling rule, recognizes that an adjoining landowner's remedy is not
to prevent production that drains his land or to sue for damages resulting
from such drainage. Rather, he must drill and produce his own wells at a
rate sufficient to prevent the drainage.39
This common law privilege of draining a neighbor's land, and the attendant necessity of protecting against such capture by offset wells,40 combined to cause much unnecessary drilling and brought about haphazard production with no relation to market requirements. 4' Disorderly drilling patterns
resulted in great economic and physical waste, and government intervention
became necessary to control the destructive self-interests of competing landowners.

Early conservation efforts sought to curb the competitive race forced
on landowners by the rule of capture. These efforts came in the form of
statutes and regulations trying to control waste, while also trying to protect
landowners' rights.42 Regulations established well-spacing requirements and
set maximum rates of production, the allowable production being allocated
between separately owned tracts within a common reservoir.4 3
The authority of a state to institute these conservation measures and to
2 OKLA. L. Rxv. 469, 470 (1949); Moses, supra note 34, at 749-51; Smith, Antitrust Aspects of
311 (1971).
36. R. MYErs, supra note 7, §101, at 15.

Joint Operations,16 RocK- MT. MINING LAw INST.

37. Hardwicke, supra note 35, at 393.
38. It has been stated that the rule of capture cannot be recognized properly in jurisdictions where the ownership-in-place concept is followed as the rule of property relating to a
landowner's interest in the substrata minerals. Thus, the antithesis to the rule of capture
occurs where "[t]he owner of a tract of land owns the oil and gas in place and, should such
minerals migrate to a neighbor's land and be produced from wells thereon, title would not
vest in the neighbor, but to the contrary, the migrating oil or gas, or at least an amount
equal to that which migrated, could be recovered by the true owner." Id. Some Florida
authority pertaining to a landowner's interest in property indicates that the state would
adhere to the ownership theory. See Miller v. Carr, 137 Fla. 114, 188 So. 103 (1939), rehearing denied, 141 Fla. 318, 193 So. 45 (1940). Absent clear precedent, however, the rule of
capture has important implications in shaping conservation measures through unitization.
39. See Eckman, supra note 5, at 343 n.6.

40. An offset well is "a well drilled on one tract of land to prevent the drainage of oil
or gas to an adjoining tract of land, on which a well is being drilled or is already in pro-

duction."

MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TmRms, supra note 15, at 294.
41. Hardwicke, supra note 35, at 393.
42. Eckman, supra note 5, at 345.
43. Id. For Florida regulations pertaining to the spacing of wells, see 4 FLA. AVrnN.
CoDE §16c-2.03 (1972). For the specific provisions relating to well spacing and allowable
production for the Jay Field and Florida's other unitized field (the Sunoco-Felda Field lo-

cated in the southern part of the state) see ADDENDu
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protect the rights of the several owners within a common reservoir was
4
established by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana."
The basis of this authority was held to be the state's police power to protect
the interest of the general public in the conservation of natural resources
and the interest of property owners against the injurious effects of wasteful
45
practices by operators in the same reservoir.
Despite these conservation efforts, undesirable physical and economic
waste continued. 4 6 State compulsory consolidation provisions were suggested
to correct the situation.
The Need for State Compulsory ConsolidationProvisions
As discussed above, under traditional property laws, ownership of a
petroleum pool or field4z is divided by vertical planes, the location of which
are determined by surface boundary lines. Operating each tract independent
of adjoining tracts results in inefficient production. Absent effective conservation methods, maximum production depends on party agreement concerning the number and spacing of wells,48 rates of production, and secondary
recovery techniques. Voluntary accord among the competing landowners
may or may not be in the best interest of the individual landowners. In any
event, voluntary agreement has been difficult to achieve.49 In its absence,
maximum recovery and the protection of correlative rights required compulsory pooling and unitization statutes.50
The terms "pooling" and "unitization" have become firmly established
in the nomenclature of the oil and gas industries. Both refer to methods
of achieving cooperative development of oil and gas properties. The terms,
however, are not synonymous. 51
GOVERNING TIE CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS IN FLORIDA BY ORDERS OF THE BOARD

(1973)

[hereinafter cited as ORDERS OF THE BOARD].
44. 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
45. Comment, Compulsory Unitization- The Answer to Oil and Gas Conservation?, 7
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 312, 313-14 (1960).
46. Eckman, supra note 5, at 345-46.
47. See note 4 supra.
48. "Well spacing" is: "[T]he regulation of the number and location of wells over an oil
or gas reservoir, as a conservation measure. It is generally agreed today that increased recovery from a reservoir is not a function of the number of wells drilled. Thus, to the extent
that more wells are drilled than necessary for maximum recovery, there is economic waste,
since the cost of drilling the unnecessary wells need not have been incurred." MANUAL OF
OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 15, at 506.
49. See generally Eckman, supra note 5, at 346-47. To pool several segments into a
drilling unit or to unitize all the drilling units in an entire reservoir requires all royalty
and working interest owners to sign an operating agreement. Experience has proved that the
complexity of such an agreement ensures that unanimity, and in many cases, mere substantial
agreement, will not result. Id. See 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, §910, at 86.
50. "Correlative rights" refers to the fact that each landowner's rights are reciprocally
dependent on the rights of every other landowners in the drilling unit.
51. While this note deals primarily with unitization, a brief insight into "pooling" in
this section and a general analysis of the compulsory pooling provisions available in Florida
in the next section, will aid total understanding of the state's consolidation provisions.
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"Pooling" refers to the "bringing together of two or more small or irregularly shaped tracts of land to form a drill site in connection with a
program of uniform well spacing." 52 Thus, pooling is basically the procedure
that is applied to a specific drilling unit,53 the area one well can efficiently
drain.5 4 Pooling draws all reluctant owners into the unit and prohibits drilling
on small tracts. Thus, it prevents the physical and economic waste that accompanies the drilling of unnecessary wells and protects the correlative rights
of landowners over a reservoir.55
"Unitization" refers to the consolidation of all or most of the drilling units
in an entire field (all wells over a common oil or gas reservoir).66 Basically,
unitization is used to denominate the joint operation of all or some portion
of the units in a producing reservoir. While pooling is important, the best
results in conservation can be attained only by unitization. Operating the
field as a single natural unit makes secondary recovery operations and exploration for deep petroleum economically feasible. 57 Only through unitization can
appropriate use of reservoir pressures be made and additional recovery
methods be utilized at the proper stage of exploitation of the oil deposits.58
Thus, compulsory pooling and unitization are essential to the conservation
of oil and gas.

52. King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Leases, 46 Micm. L. REv. 311, 312
(1948).
53. A drilling unit is "the area prescribed by applicable well spacing regulations for the
granting of a permit by the regulatory agency for the drilling of a well." For a general discussion of a drilling unit, see MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS Txms, note 15, at 135-36.
54. Under Florida well spacing regulations, when a well is sunk to a depth of less than
6,000 feet the drilling unit consists of 40 acres plus or minus 10%. When the well is drilled
to a depth greater than 6,000 feet the drilling unit is 160 acres plus or minus 10%. 4 FLA.
ADMim. Co E §16C-2.03 (1972).
55. H. WILLiAMs & C. MEYERs, supra note 10, §901, at 3. The argument for compulsory
pooling is well-stated:
"(1) Excessive drilling is wasteful, both in terms of the cost of drilling unnecessary wells
(economic waste) and in terms of unnecessary and undersirable dissipation of native reservoir
energy resulting in loss of otherwise producible hydrocarbons (physical waste).
"(2) To prevent such physical and economic waste, drilling of wells should be limited and
a uniform well spacing pattern established, e.g., one well for 20 or 40 or 80 acres.
"(3) The owner of a tract of land too small to be entitled to a well permit under the
applicable spacing rule is entitled, however, to a fair chance to recover the hydrocarbons in
place beneath his land. To deny him the right to drill a well, without otherwise affording
him some opportunity to realize on the economic value of the hydrocarbons in place, will
amount to confiscation of his interest in such hydrocarbons. But to permit him to drill a
well on his small tract will result in waste.
"(4) The solution to the dilemma posed by the problem of the small tract is compulsory
process to require the pooling of small tracts into a drilling unit of the size specified by the
applicable spacing rule." Id. §905, at 14.
56. Id. §901, at 3.
57. For a general discussion of unitization, see MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMs, supra
note 15, at 485-86.
58. Id.
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Constitutionality of Compulsory ConsolidationProvisions
Current laws requiring compulsory pooling and unitization are based on
early conservation statutes that utilized a state's police power to prevent waste
and to protect the public interest. 59 The next stage of governmental enforcement of conservation measures involved municipal drilling unit ordinances
and culminated in the landmark decision of Marrs v. City of Oxford. 0 The
city's drilling ordinance was held to be a constitutional exercise of the police
power to regulate the public health, safety and welfare, and to protect the
nondrilling owners' rights to share in production. Following this decision many
states enacted similar drilling unit statutes. 61 These statutes focused on protecting the correlative rights of small tract owners who, under the unit operation, could not obtain permits to drill because of the regulatory agency's
selection of larger, more efficient tracts for production.6 2 These statutes also
were held constitutional in spite of many diverse attacks, 6 3 and today the
constitutionality of compulsory consolidation provisions is settled.
COMPULSORY PROVISIONS IN FLORIDA

Florida currently has two compulsory provisions for combining separate
mineral interests in various segments of land into one developable oil or gas
unit.64 Although these provisions requiring pooling65 and unitizittion,66 were
adopted when there were no large oil and gas operations in Florida,6 they
exemplify the state's policy of gaining maximum benefits from its natural
resources.68
See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
32 F.2d 134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 573 (1929).
See Eckman, supra note 5, at 349.
See R. MYERS, supra note 7, §8.01, at 257-85; W. SUMMERS, supra note 10, §§83-86.4;
6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, §§905-.2 at 13-23.
63. The courts upheld the constitutionality of the statutes against attacks that they exceeded the police power, improperly delegated legislative authority to an administrative
agency or private individuals, violated due process, were vague and indefinite, denied equal
protection of the laws, were inherently arbitrary or discriminatory, impaired contract rights,
took or damaged private property for public or private use without compensation, and discriminatorily granted exclusive rights, privileges, and immunities. See Patterson v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938); R. MYERS, supra note 7, §8.01, at 266-84;
W. SuamERs, supra note 10, §§83.1-86.4; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C MEYERS, supra note 10, §905.1,
at 19; Doggett, supra note 7, at 132; Eckman, supra note 5, at 349-50.
64. See FLA. STAT. §377.27 (1973); Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, amending FLA. STAT. §377.28
(1973).
65. FLA. STAT. §377.27 (1973).
66. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28.
67. Both statutes originated in the Conservation Act of 1945. Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 22819,
§§21-22. The Florida provisions were patterned after the 1940 suggested form of oil conservation law promulgated by the Interstate Oil Compact Commission. They were modified
by some features of the Arkansas conservation law. CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL
59.
60.
61.
62.

HISTORY 64 (R. Sullivan ed. 1958).

68. Fields, Florida 1939-1948, in
(B. Murphy ed. 1949).

CONSERVATION OF OIL AND
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An overview of the Florida compulsory provisions demonstrates the state's
authority to control oil and gas operations through the Division of Interior
Resources of the Department of Natural Resources. The Division is em69
powered to enforce the provisions of the conservation law and to promulgate
70
regulations necessary for proper administration and enforcement.
Compulsory Pooling
Florida's compulsory pooling or "forced integration" statute is similar
to those of other states.71 Basically, the statute contemplates voluntary agreement 2 by the working interest owners.7 3 The owners of the drill sites to be
74
integrated must agree before petitioning the Division for voluntary integration.7 5 Where the owners fail to agree on integration, however, the Division
may order76 the parties to integrate their interests "for the prevention of
77
waste and to avoid the risks involved in the drilling of unnecessary wells."
Even where the Division is without authority to order integration (that is,
where the order is unnecessary to prevent waste and to avoid drilling unneeded wells), it is empowered to set the allowable production from each
well on the separate tracts.78
69. FLA. STAT. §377.07 (1973).
70. FLA. STAT. §377.22 (1973).
71. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §13-4-7-14 (Burns 1971); Miss. ANN. STAT. §53-3-7 (Vernon
1972). For a complete list of statutes with compulsory pooling provisions, see 6 H. WILLIAMs
& C. MEYERs, supra note 10, §905.1, at 17-19.
72. "When two or more separately owned tracts of land are embraced within an estab-

lished drilling unit, the owners thereof may validly agree to integrate their interest and to
develop their lands as a drilling unit." FLA. STAT. §377.27(i) (1973).
73.

The working interest owner owns the operating interest under an oil and gas lease

and has exclusive right to exploit the minerals on the land. "In the simple situation of a
lessor who executes a lease, reserving 1/8th royalty, to a lessee who creates no burdens on
his estate, the working interest consists of 7/8ths of production subject to all costs of exploration and development; the lessor receives his 1/8th of production free of such costs."
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAs TEMus, supra note 15, at 511.
-74. The division includes the application for integration among those matters to be
initiated by petition. "Any interested party may bring a petition to the Division requesting
4 FLA. ADMIN.
a hearing for consideration of the adoption of [the integration order] .
CODE §16C-l.02 (1972).
75. Hendry Interview, supra note 8.
76. The division has broad statutory authority under the provisions of chapter 377 to
require integration. See text accompanying note 69 supra. See also FLA. STAT. §377.22(2)(t)

(1973).
77. FLA. STAT. §377.27(1) (1973). The petition of Mitchell Energy & Development Corp.
to pool all unleased working interests and for exception to rule 16C-2.03 as regarded its
First American Farms, Inc., Well No. 1, read in part: "Petitioner has been unable to, obtain
the consent and agreement of working interest owners in this unit ... for the drilling of a
well. The forced integration of said, working interest is necessary for the prevention of waste
and the protection of the co-equal and correlative rights of all owners." ORDERs OF THE
BOARD, supra note 43, Order No. 30 pursuant to statutory rulemaking authority. FLA., STAT.
§377.22 (1973).
78. "ifihe owners of each tract embraced within the drilling unit may drill on their
respective tracts; but the allowable production therefrom shall be such proportion of.-the
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No Florida decisions have construed the compulsory pooling statute. This
is probably a result of the fact that voluntary agreement is usually reached
and when it is not the Division's authority to require integration is firmly
9
established .
Compulsory Unitization
Until recently amended, Florida's compulsory unitization statute was a
brief, two-section provision. It was very simple in form and was substantially
similar to the Indiana and Georgia unitization statutes.8 0 It also contemplated
voluntary agreement by the working interest owners, although in the absence
of agreement, the Division could order unitization81 if the required facts were
established. 8 2 The former law failed to include provisions found in most state
statutes8 3 regarding what the Division unit order must contain, how investment is to be allocated among owners in the unit area, what consent is required for the unit order to become effective, and how amendment or enlargement of the unit area is to be accomplished. The statutory amendment,
however, includes provisions detailing these points and conforms Florida
84
with the majority of other jurisdictions.
There are only two unitized fields in Florida - the Jay Field and the
Sunoco-Felda Field in southern Florida. The Jay Field illustrates the importance of unitizing a field so that different operations may be combined
and efficient recovery techniques utilized to increase recovery substantially.
Projections for the Jay Field predict that without unitization only seventeen
per cent of the oil in place (120 million barrels) would be recovered, while
under a unitized operation ultimate recovery will almost triple to slightly less
than fifty per cent of the oil in place (approximately 337 million barrels).8 5
Thus, unitization will increase potential recovery by 217 million barrels. In
light of these figures, unitization must play a major role in future Florida
discoveries.

allowable for the full drilling unit as the area of each separately owned tract bears to the
full drilling unit." FLA. STAT. §377.27(2) (1973).
79. Rules and regulatory actions of administrative agencies have been upheld under
Florida law where the power to make and enforce such activities is lawfully conferred by
the legislature, as is the power in §§377.07, .22. Fields, supra note 68. See Superior Oil Co.
v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59 So. 2d 85 (1952), for a Mississippi case construing a statute similar

to

FLA. STAT.

80.

§377.27 (1973).

Compare

STAT. §13-4-7-14

FLA. STAT.

§377.28 (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, with

(Burns 1971), and GA.

CODE ANN. §43-717(b)-(c)

IND.

(1945).

81. See FLA. STAT. §377.28(1) (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750,
to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(2).
82. See text accompanying notes 102-107 infra.
83. For tables detailing other states' unitization provisions, see Eckman, supra note 5, at
384-87.
84. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§377.28(3) (unit
order); 377.28(3)(d) (investment adjustment); 377.28(4) (required consent); 377.28(5)(a) (amendment and enlargement).
85. Hendry Interview, supra note 8.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 10
1974]

COMPULSORY UNITIZATION
ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA'S FoRIufER UNiTIzATiON STATUTE

AND THE NEWLY ADOPTED AMENDMENT

There are no cases construing the provisions of Florida's pre-1974 unitization statute and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Division under
the statute have gone unchallenged. The former statute was broad and offered
no guidelines for interested parties to follow in many important areas. The
newly adopted amendment adds some specificity but also leaves open many
important questions.8 6 With some 1,200 different parties involved in the Jay
Field and future prospects of more unitized efforts in this state, litigation will
certainly arise.
Application for a Unit Order
Neither the former statute nor the amendment contain provisions concerning application for a unit order. In addition, the regulations adopted by
the Division use very general language.8 7 In the absence of any guidelines,
informal application procedures are followed. Application is by petition to
the Division and is usually initiated either by a working interest owner, the
operator, s or a landowner.8 9 As field pressure gradually decreases and the
primary recovery possibility lessens each day, the application should be made
as soon as possible. The Division closely regulates initial drilling throughout
the state and thus is aware of the drill sites that might need unitization.
When a petition for unitization is not presented, the Division will intervene
and suggest to the interested parties that they combine their interests. If
the petition is not forthcoming, both the former statute and the amendment
implicitly allow the Division to begin the process on its own motion. 90
Once the petition is filed, either by voluntary action or by pressure or
order from the Division, a hearing is held pursuant to the Administrative

86. For example, questions concerning application for the unit order, effect to be given
the hearing examiner's findings, applicable standard for production allocation, and effect of
the unit agreement on express or implied covenants in oil and gas leases are left unanswered.
87. Rule 16C-1.02 provides in part: "Any interested party may bring a petition to the
Division requesting a hearing for consideration of the adoption of rules, regulations, special
rules, orders or changes..... 4 FLA. ADMIN. CODE §16C-1.02 (1972).
88. For the purpose of a unitization agreement "operator" is defined as "any owner of
the right, in whole or in part, to search for and produce unitized substances within the
Field, whether such right be derived from the ownership of the entire title free of lease, or
by oil, gas and mineral leases or by any other species of agreement conferring such right
and who has signed or ratified this agreement." MANUAL Or OIL AND GAs TERsS, supra note
15, at 309.
89. See R. MYEms, supra note 7, §9.01, at 304. A copy of an application form is presented in the Appendix to the Myers work, §15.20, at 677.
90. The former statute provided: "The division ... may require ... the introduction of
gas or other substance into an oil or gas reservoir for the purpose of repressuring such
reservoir, maintaining pressure or carrying on secondary recovery operations ...." FLA. STAT.
§377.28(1) (1973). The new statute contains similar language. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1,
at 750, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§377.28(2), (9).
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Procedures Act 91 to determine the petition's merits. Required notice is given
to all parties whose substantial interests will be affected by agency action?.-'
The hearing is presided over by a hearing examiner93 and each party is
accorded full due process rights.94 Probative effect is given to evidence that
is "of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs ...

whether or not such evidence would be admissible in

a trial in the courts of Florida." 95
In the above form this procedure seems fairly easy to follow. Reaching the
procedure outlined, however, requires looking beyond either the former
statute or the amendment to other provisions of chapter 377,96 to provisions of
chapter 74-310,97 to regulations promulgated by the Division,98 and finally to
the Division director himself.99 This points out the weaknesses in both the
former statute and the amendment. An improvement would include within the
unitization sections specific provisions concerning the filing and content of
petitions, 10° the giving of notice, the conduct of hearings, and the procedural
requirements to be adhered to.101 Inclusion of these provisions would consolidate the application procedure. Applications could then be dealt with more
effectively and procedures followed by those parties interested in the substantial
benefits of unitization. Only if these provisions are included in the statute will
the possibility of needless delay and loss of recoverable oil be lessened.
Findings Required To Support a Unit Order
Before the Division issues an order requiring unit operation it must find
that certain basic facts exist. The former Florida statute required the hearing
examiner to find that unitization was necessary "to prevent waste and avoid

91. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-310, §1, at 728.
92. Id. at 735.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See FLA. STAT. §§377.07, .22, .31, .32 (1973).
97. See notes 91-95 supra.
98. See 4 FLA.ADMIN. CODE §16C-1.02 (1972).
99. Hendry Interview, supra note 8.
100. For example, MICH. STAr. ANN. §319.354 (1959) provides:
"Sec. 4. Any interested lessee may file a petition with the supervisor requesting an order
for the unit operation of a pool, pools or parts thereof. The petition shall contain: (a) A
description of the pool, pools or parts thereof to be so operated, termed the unit area. (b)
The names of all persons owning or having an interest in oil and gas in the proposed unit
area, as disclosed by the records in the office of the register of the deeds for the county in
which the unit area is situated and their addresses, if known. If the address of any person is
unknown, the petition shall so indicate. (c) A statement of the type of the operations contemplated in order to effectuate the purposes of this act. (d) A recommended plan for
unitization applicable to the proposed unit area which the petitioner considers fair, reasonable and equitable."
101. See, e.g., Miss. ANN. STAT. §53-3-117 (Vernon 1972); 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §287.6
(1951).
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the drilling of unnecessary wells."' 0 2 In addition, he was required to find that
0 3
unitization was economically feasible and without unnecessary expense.
The actual findings of fact by the Division in the petition by Exxon to
unitize the Jay Field were much broader, however, in that they embraced
the findings now required by the amended statute. 04 Thus, the Division found
that special rules and regulations were "reasonably necessary in order to
regulate pressure maintenance and secondary recovery methods .... in order
to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, to increase the ultimate recovery
of Unitized Substances, to prevent waste'0 5 .. . [and] to protect correlative
rights ....106 [Further] [t]he estimated additional cost incident to conduction
of unit operation... will not exceed the value of the estimated additional recovery of oil and gas.... ,,107
Once the requisite findings have been made, the Division issues the unit
order. : 8 The order is presented to the Board of Natural Resources, which has
the ultimate responsibility of approving the unit order. 0 9 While approval of
the unit order appears to be routinely simple, actual experience is to the
contrary. A dissident minority in the Jay Field blocked unitization for almost
a year because a number of owners failed to respond favorably to the formal
unitization document to be forwarded to the Board of Natural Resources. The
Board refused to act independently until a thorough investigation could be
made and further hearings held."10 A reticent minority and some Board delay
placed the recovery of nearly 220 million barrels of oil in danger because of
decreasing reservoir pressures."' Such near tragedy exposes the weakness in
the present procedure. Neither the former statute nor the amended statutory

102.

FLA. STAT.

§377.28(1) (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to

be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(2).

103.

FLA. STAT.

§377.28(2) (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974; ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to

be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(9).

104. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to be codified as FLA.
amending FLA. STAT.

STAT.

§§377.28(2), (9),

§§377.28(1), (2) (1973).

105. OaEus OF TnE BoARD, supra note 43, Order No. 74-1, at 8-9.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id. Another laudable finding by the hearing examiner was that an abundant water
supply had been obtained for injection into the reservoir without "adverse effect upon the
environment, no significant effect upon other users of water in the area and minimal effect
upon the available water in the drainage basin." Id. at 10.
108. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(2), amending FLA. STAT. §377.28(1) (1973). The unit order includes a description of the area embraced,
which, under the former statute, could be part or all of a single pool and, under the amendment, part or all of multiple pools. Also included in the unit order are provisions dealing
with unit expenses and liens on production. The amendment also includes provision for investment, adjustment, and selection of a unit operator.
109. Hendry Interview, supra note 8.
110. The minority in the Jay Field controversy opposed the production allocation formula
contained within the unit order and unit agreement.
111. Hendry Interview, supra note 8. Further delay would have made the success of
secondary recovery operations extremely doubtful due to the complete loss of reservoir
pressure.
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language contain provisions dealing with the persuasive effect to be given to
11 2
the hearing examiner's findings or appeal procedures.
An improved statute should contain provisions to deal with the problems
experienced in the Jay Field order. Once the hearing examiner makes the
requisite findings1 3 and issues a unit order, the order should be given a presumption of validity. The Board of Natural Resources should be used as an
appeal board and not a de novo trial body. Affirmance of the order should
follow unless the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.1 14 The action of the
appeal board should be considered an exhaustion of administrative remedies,
but provisions should be made for court review.115 An improved statute
should also include provisions concerning compliance with the hearing
examiner's order during the pendency of appeal. The appealing party should
be required to comply with the unit order until overturned by the appeal
board or through judicial review.118
Adding these provisions to the amended statute would preclude a repeat
of the Jay Field controversy. The possible loss of such a large amount of
recoverable oil reserves cannot be tolerated.
Consent to the Unit Order
The former Florida statute made no provision for pre- or post-hearing
agreement before the unit order could go into effect. Under the statute one
party, presumably without consent of other affected parties within the proposed unit area, could obtain a unit order requiring cooperation. The unit
order would then become effective despite the fact that every other interested
party was opposed. But the statute was not applied in this broad manner. In
both of Florida's unitized fields the parties were in substantial agreement.', 7
The Jay Field unit agreement,118 which was incorporated into the unit order,
was signed and approved by ninety-seven per cent of the working interest
112. An appeal procedure is provided by FLA. STAT. §377.35 (1973), but apparently was
not followed in the Jay Field controversy. This casts serious doubt upon its utility in such
circumstances. Amendment should be made to include appeal provisions within the unitization statute.
The new Administrative Procedures Act also contains appeal procedures applicable to a
"party who is adversely affected by final agency action." Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-310, §1, at
728. The utility of this appeal procedure has not yet been tested.
113. See text accompanying notes 102-107 supra.
114. This would correspond to applicable standards in civil proceedings. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 52.
115. See MIcn. STAT. ANN. §319.386 (1959) for a suggested provision.
116. Id. §319.384.
117. See text accompanying note 119 infra for the percentage of agreement figures of
the Jay Field. The Sunoco-Felda Field is almost a single owner-single operator field and
near unanimous consent was obtained. Hendry Interview, supra note 8.
118. As defined by Williams & Meyers a unit agreement is: "An agreement or plan of
development and operation for the recovery of oil and gas made subject thereto as a single
consolidated unit without regard to separate ownership and for the allocation of costs and
benefits on a basis as defined in the agreement or plan." MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMas,
supra note 15, at 484-85.
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owners' interests and by eighty-six per cent of the royalty owners' interests. 19
Nevertheless, a small minority blocked implementation of the unit order.120
This demonstrates the former statute's shortcoming. Despite statutory language
that "the division may require [unitization],"1 .21 the unit order was denied
effectiveness until a year after the designated unit operator was ready to
begin operations. Minority dissenters were not forced to cooperate to conserve the state's natural resources.
The amendment adopts the better approach by remedying this situation.
It provides for post-hearing percentage agreement to make the unit order
effective. The order becomes effective upon approval by seventy-five per cent
interests of the working interest owners and by seventy-five per cent interests
of the royalty owners. 12 2 If the required percentages are not met within six
months after issuance of the order, it is automatically revoked. 1 23 This amendment forces cooperation of minority dissenters and ensures that a small
number of the parties affected by a unit order cannot cause a possible loss
24
of millions of barrels of recoverable oil.
Production Allocation
The former Florida statute required that the unit order allocate production so as to "afford to the owner of each tract the opportunity to recover his
just and equitable share of the oil and gas."' 25 The amendment substitutes
the words "fair and equitable."'126 Neither provision offers guidelines for
determining the applicable standard. Presumably, in the absence of restrictive
language the division can order allocation on any basis it deems fair.127 But
such a broad grant of implied authority has encouraged continuing criticism
of production allocation. 2 The Jay Field allocation formula was bitterly
criticized by a group of disgruntled royalty owners 29 and was the primary
cause of delay in implementing the hearing examiner's unit order.30 The

119. ORDERS OF TrHE BoARD, supra note 43, Order No. 74-1, at 18-19.
120. See text accompanying notes 110-111 supra.
121. FLA. STAT. §377.28(1) (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to
be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(2).
122. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(4), amending FLA. STAT. §377.28(2) (1973).

123. Id.
124. See text accompanying notes 110-111 supra.
125. FLA. STAT. §377.28(2) (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 751-52,
to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§377.28(3), (6).
126. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §§377.28(3), (6).

127. In the Jay Field the division incorporated into the unit order the allocation plan
offered by Exxon Company in its petition for unitization. See

ORDERS OF THE

BoARD, supra

note 43, Order No. 74-1.
128. For a discussion of the controversies that have arisen concerning application of
states' statutory language on production allocation, see Eckman, supra note 5, at 356.
129. The royalty owners were represented by the Petroleum Royalty Owners of Florida
(PROOF).
130. See text accompanying note 110 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/10

16

Mellen: Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in the Energy C
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

order's allocation formula consisted of two different measurements. One was
applied to the primary recovery phase of operations and was based on acreage
and the well allowable. 13 1 The other measurement applied to the secondary
32
This secondary rerecovery phase and was based on porosity acre-feet.
covery phase measurement was the source of controversy. The royalty owners
argued that a more equitable formula would require consideration of more
than one parameter.

33

Future dispute and delay similar to that which occurred in the Jay Field
might be avoided by substituting specificity foi generality in the amended
statute. Preferably, the statute would set out the basic formula to be applied
in determining equitable allocation. For instance, several statutes base allocation on the oil and gas value of each tract and its contributing value to
13
the unit in relation to other tract values in the unit. 4 Specific reference is
then made to the factors to be considered, such as the tract's acreage, the
quantity of recoverable oil and gas from the tract, its location in the unit,
its projected productivity in the absence of unit operations, and the burden
of operation to which the tract is or will be subjected. 35
A statute phrased in this manner guides the hearing examiner in determining allocation and serves as an explicit authoritative source on which to
base his decision. A reasonable, consistent allocation formula such as is
found in these statutes would be far superior to the overly broad language
of the current Florida statute.
Amendment and Enlargement
No statutory language pertaining to the amendment of the unit order
or enlargement of the unit area was included in Florida's former unitization
statute. Instead, amendment and enlargement were governed by rule 16C-1.02
of the Division's general rules and regulations.136 The rule allowed any interested party to petition the Division and request a hearing for consideration

131. The "well allowables" before unitization were around 1,000 barrels a day. The
primary recovery phase formula was 50% of production from each well's allowable and 50%
of each well's proportionate share of the acreage. Hendry Interview, supra note 8.
132. The porosity acre-feet method of allocation uses a basic calculation: the acreage
underlying the tract that is oil bearing times (X) the footage of oil column whose porosity is
greater than 8%. Thus, in a 100-foot column, if only 20 feet have a porosity greater than
8%, the calculation would be 20 ft./100 ft. or 1/5 X acreage that is oil bearing = production
allocated to the tract. Id.
133. The royalty owners wanted a formula based 1/4th on a unit well's capacity to
produce the field allowable of 1,000 barrels of oil daily, 1/4th on the number of acres within
the well's unit, and 1/2 on the pore volume factor (porosity acre-feet). Letter of Arden A.
Anderson, geologist and member of PROOF, to the Dep't of Natural Resources, Dec. 26,
1973.
134. See Micn. STAT. ANN. §319.356(6)(c) (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. §53-3-105(c) (1972);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §287.4(b) (1951).
135. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §287.4(b) (1951).
136. See note 43 supra and text accompanying note 70 supra.
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of orders or changes. 137 In contrast, the amendment contains specific statutory
language governing amendment and enlargement within the unitization section. This provides the necessary guidance to a party contemplating a request
for amendment or enlargement so that he need not refer to more than one
document. Basically, the amended statute grants the Division the power "by
entry of new amending orders ...

to ...add to unit operations ...

and [to]

extend the unit area as required."'13s The orders, however, do not become
effective until written agreement is reached by at least seventy-five per cent
of the working interest owners' interests and by at least seventy-five per cent
of the royalty owners' interests in the area to be added. 8 9 These requirements
are consistent with the procedure applied to the initial formation of the
40
unit in the amendment.
The adoption of these provisions provides the same safety feature needed
in the initial formation of the unit.141 It ensures that a small minority of
dissatisfied owners in the area to be added cannot block the enlargement
order thereby causing loss of oil recoverable through unitization.
Although provision for reduction of the unit area is not included in the
amendment, at least one court has held that a statutory provision giving the
regulatory agency power to amend a unit allowed not only enlargement of
the unit but reduction of the unit area as well.-' 2 Nevertheless, the statute
should also include provisions for unit reduction. If the allocation to the individual tracts is to be adjusted, the statute should also provide for notice
and hearing to the affected parties. 43
Antitrust Provisions
Unitization necessarily involves a written agreement among owners to
refrain from competing within the field and to conduct operations jointly for
the general welfare. 44 This raises the question whether the unit order violates

federal and state antitrust laws.

45

Since the federal district court decision

in United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Commission,146 federal antitrust laws have been routinely complied with. In that case the court held a

137. 4 FLA. AuN.. CODE §16C-1.02 (1972).
138. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 750, to be codified as FiA. STAT. §377.28(5)(a).
139. Fla. Laws 1974, ch.74-316, §1, at 752, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(5)(b)(2).
140. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 120-124 supra.
142. Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla. 503, 244 P.2d 843 (1951), rehearing
denied, 244 P.2d 850 (1952).
143. Cf. M IH. STAT. ANN. §319.359 (1959).
144. Doggett, supra note 7.
145. For a discussion of antitrust problems, see R. MYERs, supra note 7, §§12.01-.05;
IV.

Sum sm, supra note 10, §104, at 156-58; H. WL.uAMS & C. MEYEs,supra note 49, §911;

Doggett, supra note 7, at 25-29; Searls, Antitrust and Other Statutory Resetrictions of Unit
Agreements, Sw. LEoAL FDN., 3d INsT. ON OIL "&GAS LAw &"TAXATION 63, 84, 98-99 (1952);
Smith, supra note 35, at 338-42.
146. 75 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1948).
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unitization program that was limited to production activities14- and conservation motives, and that did not incorporate a provision for joint sale of the
products through selected trade channels at fixed prices, terms and conditions,
did not violate federal law. 148
The newly adopted amendment does not contain an exception to antitrust provisions within the unitization section. Another section of chapter
377, however, does specifically deal with state antitrust laws 14 9 and provides
for an exception in the case of unitization agreements approved by the
Division and made in the interest of conservation of oil and gas and for
the prevention of waste. 150 While this provision is complete and unambiguous,
it should be included within the unitization section to provide for consolida151
tion in a single source of all provisions affecting unitization.
This analysis of the major areas of concern in the unitization process
clearly illustrates the shortcomings of the former statute and failure of the
amendment to correct them fully. One of Florida's two attempts at unitization
was blocked for nearly a year over a controversy that could have been prevented by statutory changes. Although recoverable oil was not lost, extensive
waste could occur by such delay in the future. The recommended changes
and consolidation of all provisions into one unitization statute would clarify
the Florida law at a time when it is essential to conserve natural resources.
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

OF UNITIZATION

The creation of a unitized operation has significant legal ramifications.
Problems may arise by a unit agreement's inclusion or exclusion of certain
statutory, as well as nonstatutory, provisions. Counsel for the parties should
be aware of the more important problems and make adequate provision in
the unit agreement to deal with them.
Effect on Title
One of the important questions involved in creating a unit operation is its
effect on the title of the committed parties. 5 2 Two theories have been expressed: (I) the cross-conveyance theory, first announced by the Texas su147. The extent to which joint activities are actually necessary after the oil or gas are
brought to the surface is uncertain. Perhaps an analogy may be made to cases involving
income tax laws, where it has been held that mere separation of water, liquid hydrocarbons,
and gas by mechanical means is a production activity. See Scofield v. La Gloria Oil & Gas
Co., 268 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933 (1960).
148. 75 F. Supp. at 4-5.
149. FLA. STAT. §377.29 (1973).
150. Section 377.29 provides: "Agreements made in the interest of conservation of oil or
gas, or both, or for the prevention of waste . . . when . . . approved by the division, are
hereby authorized and shall not be held or construed to violate any of the statutes of this
state relating to trusts, monopolies, or contracts and combinations in restraint of trade."
151. See, e.g., Mien. STAT. ANN. §319.374 (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §287.15 (1969).
152. See German, Compulsory Unit Operation of Oil Pools, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 111 (1932);
Comment, The Nature of Unitized Title, 10 Sw. L.J. 146 (1956).
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preme court in Veal v. Thomason153 and (2) the contract theory.154 The crossconveyance theory reasons that each owner in the unit area has conveyed a
portion of either his working or royalty interest to every other owner and
55
simultaneously acquired an interest in every other tract in the unit area.1
Thus, the individual owner has title to a portion of each tract in the unit
area. This gives him actual ownership of a corresponding amount of the
production from those tracts. Acceptance of this theory has far-reaching
consequences, as it determines such vital matters as necessary parties to litigation,1 50 necessity of consent to the unit agreement, 57 conveyancing requirements, 58 and application of the Rule against Perpetuities. 5 9
The contract theory, on the other hand, reasons that each owner has
merely contracted for joint operation and that no conveyance of interests
has been effected.'; 0 Under this theory the individual owner has only a contract right in a predetermined portion of the total unit production. Application of this theory avoids the undesirable consequences experienced under
the cross-conveyance theory.','
No Florida court has determined the effect on title of a unitized operation. But the state's statutory method of allocating production to each tract,
as if actually produced on that tract, 62 has been held by courts in other states
to indicate acceptance of the contract theory.0 3 Therefore, in drafting the
153. 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
154. See Doggett, supra note 7, at 9-10.
155. "The cross-exchange of interests theory ... seems to be that each owner who joins
in the [unit] grants a royalty interest or a working interest, as the case may be, in his tract
and acquires an interest in every other tract so that he finally becomes the owner of like
property interest in each tract in the unit in proportion to his contribution to the unit
measured on a surface acreage basis or any other participation basis the agreement employs."
Hoffman, Some Problems in Pooling and Unitization, Sw. LEGAL FDN., 7th INST. ON OIL & GAs
LAw & TAXATION

219, 246 (1956).

156. Under the cross-conveyance theory all persons having an interest in the unitized
premises are necessary parties to an action involving any one parcel included in the agreement. 6 H. WILLiAms & C. MEYERs, supra note 10, §929.1(1), at 552.
157. The cross-conveyance theory makes necessary the consent of all persons having operating or nonoperating interests in premises affected by a unitization agreement. Id. §929.1(2),
at 553.
158. If the cross-conveyance theory is followed, the requirements of the statute of frauds
and of conveyancing statutes must be satisfied, since the agreement involves conveyance of
interests in land. Id. §929.1(3), at 554.
159. The Rule against Perpetuities would be applicable if the cross-conveyance theory
is followed, and would come into play where a right or power is given to effect unitization
at some future time. In such a case the interests must vest within the required time period.
ld. §929.1(4).
160. Doggett, supra note 7, at 9-10.
161. See notes 156-159 supra.
162. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, at 728, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(7), amending FLA. STAT. §377.28(2) (1973).
163. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955), stated:
"lAin intent that there shall be no cross transfers of royalty interests may be derived from a
provision that proportions of the unit production shall be allocated to the respective tracts
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unit agreement, counsel should expressly incorporate the statutory language.
Further, because of the absence of controlling authority, a further provision
in the agreement should negate transfer of title and thereby insure the desired
result.

6 4

Effect on Existing Leases and Implied Covenants
Unitization of a field raises the question of its legal effect on existing
leases.165 The newly adopted statutory amendment, unlike many statutes, 166
contains no provision dealing with this question. Therefore, specific provision must be included by the drafters in the unit agreement. For instance,
the Jay Field Unit Agreement (Jay Agreement) expressly provides that all
leases "are amended to the extent necessary to make them conform to the
provisions of this agreement, but otherwise shall remain in effect."'167 It
further provides that unitized operation or production will perpetuate each
lease on a tract "as if such Unit Operations had been conducted and a well
had been drilled on and was producing from each portion of each such
Tract."

68

Provisions of this type should be adequate in most cases, but counsel
should note one particular problem situation. The second provision in the
Jay Agreement affects the habendum clause included in most oil and gas
leases. A habendum clause usually provides that the lease is to remain in
effect so long as oil and gas are produced from the leased land. 169 The Jay
Agreement, however, preserves the lease on a tract for as long as the unitized
field is in operation.170 This result places the lessor in an unfair position when
unit boundaries include only part of his acreage in the unit area.' 7' The exand that the portion so allocated to each tract shall be treated as if it had actually been
produced from such tract." Id. at 931.

164. The Jay Field Unit Agreement contains appropriate language: "Nothing herein
shall be construed to result in the transfer of title to Oil and Gas Rights by any
hereto to any other party or to [the] Unit Operator." JAY FIELD UNIT AGREEMENT art.
THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INsTrruTE (A.P.I.) MODEL FORM OF UNIT AGREEMENT art.
(3d ed. 1970) contains the exact language of the Jay Agreement [hereinafter cited as

party

3, §6.
3, §5
A.P.I.

MODEL FORM OF UNIT AGREEMENT].

See generally R. MYERs, supra note 7, § 14.02; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
§953, at 708; Doggett, supra note 7, at 302.
See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §319.364 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §287.9 (1951).
The JAY FIELD UNIT AGREEMENT, art. 3, §4, follows verbatim the A.P.I. MoDE. FoRM
OF UNr AGREMENT by providing: "The provisions of the various leases, agreements, division
and transfer orders, or other instruments pertaining to the respective Tracts, or the production therefrom, are amended to the extent necessary to make them conform to the provisions
of this agreement, but otherwise shall remain in effect ...
168. Id.
169. See R. MYERS, supra note 7, §14.02(2).
170. This necessarily follows because the Jay Agreement, like most agreements, allocates
production to each tract as if it had actually been produced on that tract. See generally
R. MYERS, supra note 7, §14.02; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS, supra note 10, §953, at 708.
171. See R. MYERS, supra note 7, §14.02(4); 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10,
§953; Doggett, supra note 7, at 302.
165.
note 10,
166.
167.
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cluded acreage does not figure into the unit allocation formula, yet it is
held under the lease by operations on the included area. No Florida court
has had occasion to construe a provision of this type. In this particular fact
situation, however, such a provision could be constitutionally challenged as
violative of due process. The lessor is being deprived of his rights in outside acreage and of the royalty that would be attributable to the excluded
73
acreage 72 though the lease continues in force.
When faced with this situation in drafting the unit agreement, counsel
the
should foreclose the possible challenge by including a provision 17that
4 This
area.
unit agreement will not affect lands lying outside the unit
added provision is a "Pugh" clause" 5 and would return the excluded acreage
to control of the lessor in the absence of actual production thereon.
Counsel should also give consideration to the effect of unitization on implied covenants in oil and gas leases.176 There are four basic implied covenants
78
to be considered. 77 First, is the covenant to drill an exploratory well,1 which
has become of minor significance because of common usage of a delay rental
7
The covenant is further eroded by unitization because unitization
clauseY.
8 0 But the
usually follows substantial development of a source of supply.
covenant may raise questions when a unit is formed prior to the drilling of
the first well in a field. This is the situation in the Blackjack Creek Field,
172. The lessor's entire tract might be underlain with oil, but if part of the tract is ex-

cluded by the unit boundaries the excluded acreage would not enter into the allocation
formula. Thus, the entire tract might be drained by unit operations while the lessor's allocated production would be based on only partial contribution of the tract.

173. Several commentators have argued that exclusion of the provision would be unfair
to the lessee who is forced by the Board order into the unit and would be deprived "wilynilly" of his right to the outside acreage. See, e.g., Custy & Knowlton, Compulsory Fieldwide
Unitization Comes to Mississippi, 86 MLss. L.J. 123, 138-40 (1965). Including the provision,
however, deprives the lessor of his rights to the outside acreage. In such a case, where unitiza-

tion changes the original bargain between lessor and lessee, equity would best be served by
cancelling the lease.
174. See Miss. CODE ANN. §6132-106 (1972). An oil and gas lessee will not benefit by such
a provision, however, and may argue against its inclusion.
175. A "Pugh clause" has been defined as: "[A] pooling clause which provides that
drilling operations on or production from a pooled unit or units shall maintain the lease in
force only as to lands included within such unit or units." MANUAL OF OIL AND GAs TEMs,

supra note 15, at 361.
176. See generally Doggett, supra note 7; Gibbens, The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Implied Covenants in ,Oil and Gas Leases, 4 OKLA. L. Rxv. 337 (1951); Merrill, supra
note 35; Williams & Meyers, The Effect of Pooling and Unitization Upon Oil and Gas
Leases, 45 CALnr. L. REv. 411 (1957).
177. See Doggett, supra note 7, at 291.
178. The implied covenant to drill an exploratory well apparently arose out of the
early practice of the lessee paying only a nominal bonus consideration for the lease. Therefore, the covenant was developed to protect the lessor who would be otherwise deprived of
any benefit from the grant of exclusive rights to the lessee. See Mills v. Hartz, 277 Kan. 218,
94 P. 142 (1908).
179. A "delay rental clause" is a "lease clause providing for the payment of delay rentals
to keep a lease alive during the primary term despite failure to obtain production or to
commence drilling operations." MANUAL OF OIL AND GAs TEams, supra note 15, at 108.
180. See Doggett, supra note 7, at 293.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/10

22

Mellen: Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in the Energy C
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

which the division desires to unitize prior to any production. 18' The question
raised is whether unit production relieves the lessee of the obligation to drill
or pay rental. Under similar circumstances the Louisiana supreme court has
held that payment to the lessor of royalties accruing from the unitized
operation satisfies the lessee's obligation. 18 2 In the absence of Florida authority,
however, counsel confronted with this situation should specifically provide
for this result in the unit agreement.
The second covenant to be considered is the covenant to reasonably develop.18 3 As applied to a unit operation this covenant has been held to relieve
the lessee of the responsibility of developing each tract separately.8 4 But
unitization does not remove the lessee's duty to explore and develop the
lease as a whole. 85 This raises the question whether producing wells drilled
upon the unit, but not upon the lessor's land, will satisfy the lessee's "reasonable development" duty. At least one court in an analogous situation has
held that unit development is sufficient to keep the lease in force.18 6 But the
lessee's development obligations imposed by the implied covenants of the lease
will be measured by the development of the unit in which the leased premises
are included.' 8 - There is a dearth of reasonable development precedent, indicating either that serious developmental problems have not arisen or that
such problems as have arisen were resolved by negotiation among interested
parties. 88 When the unit agreement covers a large area, however, counsel
is advised to make specific provision in the agreement concerning the effect
of the lease's express or implied covenants on the lessee's development obligations. 89
181. The Blackjack Creek Field is located just south of the Jay Field. Production from
the field is being delayed because of the toxic nature of the minerals. Unitization before
production actually begins would provide the ultimate conservation protection. Hendry
Interview, supra note 8.
182. Schnitt v. Woods, 125 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 1960).
183. The standard principally used to measure the lessee's action in this respect is that
of the reasonably prudent operator, having due regard for the interests of both the lessor and
lessee. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
184. See Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d 914

(1952).
185. See Merrill, Unitization Problems: The Position of the Lessor, I OKLA. L. REv. 119,
138 (1948).
186. Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947). This case involved a
drilling unit (pooling) established by state conservation authority. The plaintiff sued for
partial cancellation of the leases upon the ground that the primary terms had expired without production being obtained. A producing well had been drilled upon the unit but not
upon the plaintiff's land. The court held that this production extended the life of plaintiff's lease beyond the primary term.
187. 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, §955.3, at 734.
188. Id.
189. Id. The Oklahoma statute contains appropriate language: "Operations carried on
under and in accordance with the plan of unitization shall be regarded and considered as a
fulfillment of and compliance with all of the provisions, convenants, and conditions, express
or implied, of the several oil and gas mining leases upon lands included within the unit
area ..
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §287.9 (1951). Absent such statutory language, provision
in the unit agreement concerning development obligations will displace express or implied
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A third covenant to consider is the covenant to protect the leasect
premises against drainage. 90 It should have no application in a unitized
operation because where the lease has been subjected to unitization, the
lessee's duty is to protect the unit as a whole rather than the individual
leases.' 9 ' The individual owners receive their returns through the formula
apportioning them a share of the income from the entire unit. 92 Attorneys
should inform unit participants of the noneffectiveness of this covenant to
avoid possible disagreement between lessors and lessees.
Finally, the covenant to market the products 93 may be significantly affected by compulsory unitization. One important case has held that the unit
lessees become trustees for the benefit of royalty owners and owe them the
fiduciary duty of marketing the product at the highest market price. 94 In
the absence of Florida case law on point, this decision should be a red flag
to drafters of the unit agreement regarding the onerous burden that may
be placed on lessees. 195 Provision should be made in the unit agreement that
lessors in receiving royalty payments are entitled to no more than the prevailing market price in the field. 96 Such a provision would relate to the
market price applied by the Florida statute when dealing with unit expense
97
and a defaulting working interest owner.
Effect on Unit Expenses
Another important question involved in unit operation is the allocation
of unit expenses. 98 The former Florida statute made no provision for this
allocating to guide counsel in drafting a unit agreement. 9 9 The amendment,
lease provisions on the subject only when the lessors are parties to the unit agreement or
are bound by it under compulsory process. See 6 H. WIULiMs & C. MEYERS, supra note 10,
§955.3, at 734.
190. See text accompanying note 39 supra; Doggett, supra note 7, at 296.
191. Doggett, supra note 7, at 296.
192. Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary Recovery, 4 OKLA. L. Rav. 177, 195 (1951).
193. See 2 E. BROWN, TnE LAW oF OIL AND GAs LEASES §16.02, at 16-72 (2d ed. 1973).
194. Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954), second appeal, 325 P.2d 1047 (Okla. 1958).
195. For instance, in Young three companies were purchasing oil from the unitized area
at the price of $2.65 per barrel. During the second year of unitized operations Phillips
Petroleum Co. posted a price of $3.00 per barrel, which was effective for approximately
2 1/2 months. In holding that the unit owed the lessors the duty of selling its oil at the
highest market price available the court brushed aside the lessee's argument that the royalty
owners were bound by the division orders prior to unitization. 275 P.2d at 308. Thus, the
decision necessitates the lessee checking every potential buyer to obtain the highest product
price in a fluctuating market.
196. For instance, in the case example in note 195 supra, the prevailing market price in
the field would be $2.65.
197. See Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(9). The
former Florida statute also contained the identical provision on market price. See FLA. STAT.
§377.28(2) (1973). See also note 199 infra.
198. For a discussion of unit expenses, see Eckman, supra note 5, at 375-79.
199. The statute simply provides that the unit operator has the right to take a defaulting
party's share of the expenses out of production, with the value of production to be calculated
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however, does offer assistance by providing that expenses are to be charged
"to the separately owned tracts in the same proportions that such tracts share
in unit production." 200 The expenses chargeable to the tract are paid by "the
person or persons not entitled to share in production free of operating costs
and who, in the absence of unit operation, would be responsible for the
expense of developing and operating such tracts."20 1 Incorporation of these
provisions in the unit agreement202 would presumably avoid the difficulty experienced by other jurisdictions where expenses were allocated to parties
2 03
responsible for the costs under the governing statute.
Some owners may fail to pay unit expenses, however, and the drafters of
the unit agreement should provide for default. Most unit agreements provide that if any working interest owner fails to pay his share of unit expenses, the other working interest owners will each pay a proportionate part
of the unpaid share.20 This provision in a Division-ordered agreement is
unfair to the nondefaulting tracts, as it places an unjustified, additional
burden upon them. A better provision would require the defaulting working
interest owner's share of expenses to be taken out of his 7/8ths proportionate
right to production 20 5 until the expenses are paid, with no resort to the
other working interest owners in case of default.206 Thus, as concluded by
the amendment, the owners' obligations should be "several, and not joint or
collective."

20

7

Another provision, contained in both the former statute2-08 and the
amendment,20 9 should be incorporated into the unit agreement. In the
event a dry hole is drilled "no liability for any part of the cost of drilling
said well shall attach to any person or persons by reason of the integration
order of the division." 210

]-his

provision protects the other working interest

owners in the unit who might otherwise be charged with a proportionate
amount of the loss.

1
1

Effect on Income Taxation
The effect of unitized operations on income taxation is of prime concern
to the practitioner drafting a unit agreement. If the agreement is improperly

by the prevailing market price at the time such production is received. See
§377.28(2) (1973).

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1,to be codified as FLA.
Id.
See JAY FIELD UNIT AGREEMENT art. 3, §3.
See Eckman, supra note 5, at 376.
Id. at 377.
See note 73 supra.

206.

See JAY

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(3)(e ).
See FLA. STAT. §377.28(2) (1973).
See Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-316, §1, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §377.28(9).
Id.
See note 73 supra.

FIELD UNIT AGREEMENT art.

STAT.

FLA.

STAT.

§377.28(3)(e).

3, §3.
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worded some of the advantages of unitization will be outweighed by loss of
2 12
tax benefits otherwise available to individual owners.
Counsel must carefully draft the unit agreement to avoid creation of
an association that would be taxable as a corporation. 213 Consideration must
be given to two revenue rulings that govern the treatment of the unit as a
corporation. Income Tax Unit Ruling (I.T.) 4940214 determined that one
of the essential characteristics of an association is the presence of an objective
to carry on business for joint profit. In this regard, the ruling stated:
Manifestly, profits arise not from mere extraction or from the
processing of mineral, but from the sale thereof. Accordingly, it seems
dear that if the joint objective is limited to development and the extraction and processing of mineral.., for division in kind or for sale
for the accounts of the several participants individually, the test of a
joint venture for profit is not met. ....

215

[Where agreements irrevocably vest the operator in his representative capacity with the authority to extract and sell the mineral, there
are created for income tax purposes associations taxable as corporations .... 216
Therefore, to avoid corporate taxation the drafter should carefully track
217
the appropriate language of this ruling in the unit agreement.
This issue was further explained by I.T. 3948,218 which clarified the
limitations inherent in the distinction drawn in I.T. 3930 between revocable
representative capacity (authority to act for more than one co-owner for the
time being) and collective irrevocable representative capacity (authority to
act for more than one co-owner including himself). In essence:
[I]f one entity has only revocable authority in its representative
capacity to market the production for two or more co-owners a corporation for income tax purposes does not exist, and the entity will not be
considered to have irrevocable authority if it may market for two or
more co-owners for periods of time consistent 2with
the minimum needs
9
of the industry, but not longer than one year. 1
Therefore, in order to protect the unit participants fully the operator's duty

212. See R. MmRns, supra note 6, §§10.01-.08; Appelman, Unitization Problems, N.Y.U.
9th INsT. ON FED. TAX. 461 (1951); Brabson, Current Tax Problems in the Field of Unitization, Sw. LEGAL FDN., 7th INST. ON OiL & GAs LAw & TAXATION 627 (1956); Doggett, supra

note 7, at 27-89.
213. See Doggett, supra note 7, at 29.
214. 1948-2 Cum. BuLL. 126.
215. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
217. A good example is found.in the Jay Agreement: "The Unitized Substances allocated
to each Tract shall be delivered in kind to the respective parties entitled thereto by virtue
of the ownership of Oil and Gas Rights therein or by purchase from such owners ...
JAY FIELD UNrr AGRExENT art. 6, §3.

218. 1949-1 Cum. BuLL. 161.
219. R. Mmas, supra note 7, §10.02(3), at 344-45 (emphasis added).:..
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should be limited to revocable authority to dispose of production not taken
2
0
in kind 22 on a temporary time basis. 21

Once treatment as a corporation has been avoided successfully, counsel
must next consider the problem of creating a partnership. Unit operations
typically are taxable as partnerships under the Internal Revenue Code. 222 But
the Code allows exclusion of an organization from the partnership provisions
by election, if certain requirements are met.2-23 Specifically, the organization
must be utilized "for the joint production, extraction, or use of property but
' 22- 4
not for the purpose of selling services or property produced or extracted. "
Treasury regulations promulgated under the partnership section225 add the
further requirement that the parties must "[r]eserve the right separately to
take in kind or dispose of their share of any property produced. '"226 Thus, the
partnership provision uses the exact language of I.T. 3930 and I.T. 3948
2

as a basis for exclusion.

27

The drafter of the unit agreement, therefore, can avoid the corporationpartnership problem by incorporating the required language of I.T. 3930 and
I.T. 3948, and by electing to exclude the unit organization from the partnership provision of the Code. The exclusion election can easily be contained in
the agreement and thus be made when the agreement is executed by the
228
participants.
These last sections illustrate the important role of counsel in the unitization process. He must recognize the possible problem areas and know how to
handle them effectively. Careful planning and drafting of the unit agreement
will protect participants and help insure a successful operation.

220. If the production is taken in kind there would be no corporate status problem. See
text accompanying note 215 supra.
221. Thus, the JAY FIELD UNIT AGREEMENT, art. 6, §4, provides: "[T]he Unit Operator
shall have the right, but not the obligation, subject to revocation at will of such party [the
party failing to take in kind or separately dispose of his share] . . . in order to avoid curtailing the operations of the Unit Area . . . to dispose of such production on a day-to-day
basis in any manner the Unit Operator sees fit ...."
222. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §761(a) defines "partnership" as a: "[S]yndicate, group,
pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which
any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the
meaning of this title, a corporation or a trust or estate."

223.

See

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §761(a). For a general discussion of the exclusion pro-

cedure, see R. MYERs, supra note 7, §10.03(4), at 357.

224.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §761(a)(2).

225. Id. §761(a).
226. Treas. Reg. §l.761-1(a)(2)(iii)(b) (1973).
227. Compare text accompanying note 215 supra, with text accompanying notes 224-226
supra.
228. For instance, the appropriate provision could read: "[I]f for Federal income tax
purposes this agreement and the operations hereunder are regarded as a partnership, then
each of the parties hereto elects to be excluded from the application of all the provisions of
Subchapter K, Chapter 1, Subtitle A, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as permitted and
authorized by Section 761 of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
JAY FIELD UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENT, art. 8, §3.
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CONCLUSION

Our nation's dwindling oil reserves require that waste in recovery and
production be eliminated. Strict conservation measures must be implemented
to insure maximum recovery. Compulsory unitization statutes can enhance
oil and gas supply by treating oil reservoirs as the natural producing units
that they are. Florida's unitization statute was enacted in 1945 before the
state became a major oil producer and its essential form was not amended
until mid-1974. Major changes were needed in the statute, which provided
only vague guidelines concerning formation and procedural rules and regulations governing the unit. The recent amendments to section 377.28 are helpful, but they stop short in resolving several of the unanswered questions of
the former statute.
The future prospect of excessive demand for oil and gas reserves coupled
with the probability of more significant exploration and development in
Florida require that the state have a clear statutory framework for conservation
authority. An improved statute and informed counsel to draft agreements
that properly deal with the legal consequences of unitization can insure
maximum production while protecting the correlative rights of the unit
participant. Compulsory unitization must be given a new emphasis in the
energy crisis.
ROBERT LEE MELLEN,
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